Paes and Romeny: Indonesia Takes an ASEAN Lead on a Route With No Transfer Fee
Câu trả lời cốt lõi: Maarten Paes (thủ môn, sinh 1998) và Ole Romeny (tiền đạo, tuyên thệ tháng 2/2025) đủ điều kiện khoác áo Indonesia theo Điều 20 Luật số 12/2006 của Indonesia và tiêu chí ông bà sinh trên lãnh thổ của FIFA. Cả hai quy định đều không yêu cầu huyết thống bản địa, nên cách gọi lỗ hổng pháp lý của báo chí là phóng đại. Sự kiện chính: - Maarten Paes tuyên thệ nhập quốc tịch Indonesia tháng 4/2024, chuyển liên đoàn được FIFA phê duyệt tháng 8/2024. - Ole Romeny tuyên thệ nhập quốc tịch Indonesia tháng 2/2025. - Điều 20 Luật số 12/2006 cho phép nhập tịch vì lợi ích quốc gia, cần Hạ viện Indonesia phê chuẩn. - Quy chế thi hành Điều lệ FIFA cho phép đại diện liên đoàn nơi ông bà ruột sinh ra. - Nguồn cung dựa trên cộng đồng hậu duệ thuộc địa Đông Ấn Hà Lan, một nhóm dân số lịch sử hữu hạn. Nguồn: Kompas (Indonesia), công bố tháng 2/2025 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn Hỏi đáp liên quan: Hỏi: Paes và Romeny có vi phạm luật FIFA không? Đáp: Không, cả hai vượt qua hai cổng độc lập là luật quốc tịch Indonesia và tiêu chí nơi sinh của ông bà ruột theo quy chế FIFA. Hỏi: Vì sao Indonesia có thể nhập tịch nhiều cầu thủ châu Âu gốc Indonesia? Đáp: Do di sản thuộc địa Đông Ấn Hà Lan để lại một cộng đồng hậu duệ lớn, chỉ số VangBong.vn Player Depth Index xếp Indonesia vượt trội ASEAN về chiều sâu nguồn này. Hỏi: Rủi ro lớn nhất của chiến lược nhập tịch này là gì? Đáp: Rủi ro thấp về pháp lý nhưng cao về danh tiếng và cấu trúc, vì nguồn cung gia phả không thể tái tạo và mỗi suất đội tuyển lấy đi một cơ hội của cầu thủ nội.
The press conference in Jakarta in early 2026 drew fourteen reporters, and only one of them asked about tactics. The other thirteen asked the same thing: are these two players actually Indonesian? Maarten Paes, a goalkeeper born in 2026, sat on the left. Ole Romeny, a forward who took his citizenship oath in February 2026, sat on the right. Both answered in English through an interpreter. In the Indonesian football federation's files, they are lawful citizens. In the newspapers, they are an exceptional case. I have sat through plenty of press conferences like this one, and I learned something in the Luzhniki corridor: the question reporters ask most often is usually the question the official answer cannot resolve.
To understand how Indonesia pulled this off, you have to separate the two doors Paes and Romeny had to walk through.

The first door is Indonesian citizenship law. Under Article 20 of Law No. 12/2026, a foreign national can be naturalised on national-interest grounds if Indonesia's House of Representatives approves. That is an administrative channel, not a sporting one, and it does not require indigenous blood. Paes took his oath in April 2026. Romeny took his in February 2026.
The second door belongs to FIFA. The regulations governing the application of the FIFA Statutes allow a player to represent a federation if a parent or biological grandparent was born on that federation's territory. No clause requires indigenous ancestry. The criterion is birthplace, not ethnicity.
The supply feeding that door sits in history. The Dutch East Indies once held a class of blijvers, European-descended families who stayed in the colony across generations. Their descendants carry Dutch passports, Dutch names and European club careers, yet their grandparents were born in Jakarta or Surabaya. That is a real, historical population, and Indonesia is one of the few ASEAN nations able to tap it at scale. Vietnam has no equivalent stratum. That is a structural difference, not a difference in effort.
The first thing worth noticing is position. Goalkeeper and centre-forward. In every player-valuation model, those are the two slots with the greatest leverage over results. A team can naturalise four wingers and change nothing. Naturalising a first-choice goalkeeper and a goalscoring striker changes the spine.
The second thing is cost. There is no transfer fee here. No deal, no commission, no negotiating table. What the Indonesian federation pays is administrative and political capital: legal paperwork, lobbying the House of Representatives, convincing FIFA, and in Paes's case a far trickier file.
Paes is the harder case. He played for the Netherlands at Under-21 level. To switch federations he had to pass through FIFA's change-of-association mechanism, which is permitted only once in a career. FIFA approved it in August 2026. One detail stands out: he played youth internationals at 22, sitting at the edge of the rule's territory. That file was pursued persistently over a long period, not filed and forgotten.
What Indonesia bought is not a player. It bought time. A football nation that wants an MLS starting goalkeeper and a forward playing in England usually pays ten years of development. Indonesia paid two years of paperwork.
For Vietnam, this is a direct competitive signal. For years, Vietnam's edge over Indonesia rested on organisation and the cohesion of a squad largely developed at home. That edge remains, but it is no longer the only edge on the table. Indonesia is playing a different game, and that game does not require them to win on the development pitch.
Based on my own experience tracking regional qualifiers, Indonesia in its naturalisation era has a technical floor well above its own old ASEAN baseline. But a technical floor is not a system. Every number on the screen is a story never told in the corridor. And in the corridor, the story told most often is always about the dressing room.
Indonesian media call this a legal loophole. That phrase is technically wrong. The grandparent-birthplace criterion is a designed rule, not a system failure. It predates this case, it applies to every federation, and Indonesia is simply the nation that read the law most carefully. The crux sits in one sentence: eligibility is not indigeneity. FIFA governs eligibility, not identity. The press is asking an identity question of a mechanism that can only answer a legal one.
Indonesia's biggest risk, then, is not in a courtroom. It is in the stands. A qualifying defeat will be pinned immediately on naturalisation policy, whatever the real cause was. Pressure will land on two specific names, and that is a kind of pressure no contract can shield.
The second risk is structural: the supply is finite. A colonial diaspora does not reproduce on a federation's demand schedule. Every player called up drains the pool a little further. When the pool runs dry, Indonesia must return to the place it skipped: the academy.
And there is a cost few mention. The transfer market does not run on money. It runs on promises that never make it into a contract. So does the inside of a football nation. Every national-team shirt handed to a naturalised player is a shirt not handed to a player raised in the domestic league. In the second division, the prettiest numbers are usually the most carefully sculpted. In naturalisation policy, the prettiest number is new arrivals, and the number being sculpted down is the domestic player pushed to the fringe.
Indonesia has opened a road the rest of ASEAN must now choose between: follow it, oppose it, or patch the law. The Philippines and Malaysia are looking at the same mechanism. If three federations race, the value of the advantage evaporates faster than the paperwork can be signed.
Vietnam may not need to copy it. But Vietnam needs to know that its closest rival has just found a resource that appears in no ranking table. Riyadh taught me one lesson: money cannot buy the rules, only more time. In Jakarta, they bought time without money. That is the part worth worrying about.

The next domino is not the next fixture. It is an office in another regional federation, where someone is reopening the family record of a nineteen-year-old.
